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LAWS
EX POST FACTO
et al.: Ex
Post Facto Laws
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9:
No Bill of Attainder or ex postfacto Law shall be passed.
U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 10:
No State shall ... pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law
or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts ....
SUPREME COURT
NEW YORK COUNTY
People v. Griffin1
(decided December 5, 1996)
Defendant, Patrick Griffin, was convicted of sodomy and
falsifying business records, and was released on bail pending his
sentence. 2 He was eventually sentenced to concurrent prison
terms of three and one-third to ten years and one and one-third to
four years. 3 Pending defendant's appeal, the Appellate Division,
First Department, stayed the execution of the judgment. 4 After
the stay was issued, the lower court raised issue in this case
regarding its failure to certify the defendant as a sex offender
pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act (hereinafter
"SORA"). 5 Defendant claimed that the court was deprived of
jurisdiction to certify him as a sex offender because SORA is an

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

652 N.Y.S.2d 922 (1996).
Id. at 923.
Id.
Id.
Id. See Corr. L. §§ 168 et seq. [L.1995, c. 192 §3 (effective Jan. 21,

1996)]) which states in pertinent part: "Upon conviction the court shall certify
that the person is a sex offender and shall include the certification in the order
of commitment."
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unconstitutional ex-post facto law as applied to him. 6 The
supreme court held that defendant did not meet his burden of
proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the certification
provisions of SORA violated the ex-post facto clause of the
Federal Constitution. 7
SORA is a New York State statute that was passed in order to
protect the public from sex offender recidivism and enhance the
information available to law enforcement authorities and the
general public so that apprehension and prosecution of sex
offenders could be more effective. 8 The statute requires that all
convicted sex offenders be classified according to their level of

risk of recidivism, and that they register with governmental
authorities prior to their release from incarceration. 9 One of the
sections of the statute requires the court to certify that the person

is a sex offender, and to include the certification in the order of
commitment. 10 Defendant argued SORA, in its entirety, violated
the prohibition against ex-post facto laws. 11 The fact that
6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. This section provides in pertinent part: "No
State shall ... pass any ... ex post facto Law . . " Id.
7. Griffin, at 926.
8. Id.at 924.
9. Id.
10. Corr.L § 168-d(1).
11. Griffin at 924.
Defendant also argued, alternatively, that the
conviction itself constituted compliance with the statutory requirement of
certification and the court lacked jurisdiction because the Appellate Division
Justice stayed all subsequent actions, and that the court lacked jurisdiction to
enter an order in compliance with § 168-d(1) because the enforcement of
SORA had been enjoined. Id.at 925, 927. First, the supreme court stated
that, if a conviction for a sex offense constituted sufficient compliance with the
statute, the statute requirement of certification would be without meaning. Id.
at 925. Second, the court decided that the argument regarding the Appellate
Division's order to stay failed for two reasons. Id. One reason is that the
only portion of the judgment remaining unfinished was the sentence, not the
adjudication of guilt. Id. That decision is finished when the jury renders its
verdict. Id. The other reason that defendant's argument fails is that the court
has a well-settled power to correct its own records, where the correction
relates to inadvertent errors by the court. Id. See People v. Wright, 56
N.Y.2d 613, 450 N.Y.S.2d 473, 435 N.E.2d 1088 (1982); People v. Minaya,
54 N.Y.2d 360, 364, 445 N.Y.S.2d 690, 692, 429 N.E.2d 1161, 1163 cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 1024 (1982) (stating that courts can make changes to correct
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defendant committed the crime prior to the enactment of SORA
12
was uncontested.
The court analyzed the defendant's ex-post facto argument
based on the United States Constitution since the New York State
Constitution does not contain a provision regarding ex post facto
laws. The court stated that it is a basic tenet of statutory
interpretation that a statute should not be set aside as
unconstitutional unless such a conclusion is inescapable. 13 The
court further stated that a strong presumption in favor of
constitutionality of legislative enactments exists, and that the
burden rests with the challenger of the statute. 14
In Hope v. Perales,15 a New York statute failed to include
medically necessary abortions in a prenatal care public funding
scheme for women with incomes up to a certain percent over the
federal poverty level. 16 The court stated in its analysis that the
court's role does not include passing upon the wisdom of the
legislature, and that a strong presumption! in favor of
constitutionality exists. 17 The burden rests with the challenger of
the statute to prove that the statute is unconstitutional. 18 The

defects in sentencing orders notwithstanding a statutory prohibition against
modification of sentences). In this case since the court inadvertently failed to
certify defendant as a sex offender, the court was in a position where it was
necessary to correct the error. Griffin, at 925. Third, only public notification
provisions of SORA have been enjoined, the certification provisions have not
been enjoined. Id. at 927.
12. Id. at 925.
13. Griffin at 925, 926.
14. Id at 926.
15. 83 N.Y.2d 563, 634 N.E.2d 183, 611 N.Y.S.2d 811 (1994).
16. Id. at 571, 634 N.E.2d at 184, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 812. In Hope,
plaintiffs commenced the action against the Commissioners of Social Services
and Health seeking a preliminary injunction against implementation of New
York's Prenatal Care Assistance Program (PCAP) to the extent it does not
include funding for medically necessary abortions. Id. at 573, 634 N.E.2d at
185, 186, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 813, 814. See N.Y. PUBLIc HEALTH LAW § 2520
et seq. (McKinney 1987).
17. Id. at 575, 634 N.E.2d at 186, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 814.
18. Id. at 574, 634 N.E.2d at 188, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 814.
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New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division's
decision and declared the statute unconstitutional. 19
Applying the rule derived from Hope v. Perales, the Griffin
court concluded that the defendant's argument that SORA was an
unconstitutional ex-post facto law must be rejected, since the
defendant offered nothing more than a vague, general declaration
that SORA violated the U.S. Constitution's provision against ex
post facto laws.20 The court noted, however, that even if the
defendant's claim was judged on its merits, the constitutional
challenge would nevertheless fail since SORA is not even
considered an "ex-post facto law" according to the common law
21
definition.
The court defined ex-post facto laws as laws that "retroactively
increase the punishment for criminal acts. '"22 In Collins v.
Youngblood, 2 3 the U.S. Supreme Court was presented with the
question of whether the application of a Texas statute, which was
passed after respondent's crime and which allowed the
reformation of an improper jury verdict, violated the Ex Post
Facto Clause. 24 The Court held that the statute was not
unconstitutional since it did not make an act criminal, deprive
someone of any of the available defenses or make the punishment
25
more burdensome after the act was committed.
In Griffin, the court compared the certification provisions of
SORA to the far more burdensome and punitive registration
provisions of SORA. The registration provisions require that the
sex offenders list information regarding very personal
information including a description of the offense for which the
sex offender was convicted. This information is to be available
to the public and is included on a recording when one dials a 900
number set up for this purpose. 26 The court noted that the
19. Id. at 571, 634 N.E.2d at 184, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 812.
20. Griffin at 926.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. 497 U.S. 37 (1990).
24. Id.at 39.
25. Id.at 52.
26. Corr.L § 168-b (1995).
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registration provisions have been upheld against ex post facto
challenges since they do not constitute "punishment" within the
meaning of the ex post facto clause. 27 Therefore, the challenge
against the less burdensome and punitive certification provisions,
the court reasoned, must be rejected.
The New York courts have no state constitutional provision
regarding ex post facto laws to follow. Their analysis involves
the United States Constitution since Article I, section 10 of the
U.S. Constitution dictates how the states will act in regards to ex
post facto laws, it specifically mandates that none will be passed.
The court, however, in Griffin found that the law at issue was not
an ex post facto law. 28 Under a federal or state constitutional
analysis, ex post facto laws are not allowed. In analyzing
whether a law is an ex post facto law, both federal and state
courts have answered the question by determining whether the
law has a punitive effect, that is, which punishes conduct which,
at the time it occurred, was not punishable. 29 The ban applies
only to measures which are criminal or penal. 30 However, the
dividing line between criminal and civil penalties is not always
clear. New York courts and federal courts have held that
certification provisions of SORA are not penal in nature,
therefore the Griffin court of New York reasoned that the less
punitive certification provisions are also not penal, and therefore
not ex post facto laws.

27. Griffin at 926.

28. Id.
29. Id..
30. Id.
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